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Paying for Safety: Preferences for Mortality Risk Reductions on Alpine Roads
Christoph M. Rheinberger 1,2

Abstract: This paper presents a choice experiment, which values reductions in mortality risk
on Alpine roads. These roads are on one hand threatened by common road hazards, on the
other hand they are also endangered by natural hazards such as avalanches and rockfalls.
Drawing on choice data from frequently exposed and barely exposed respondents, we are not
only able to estimate the VSL but to explore how the respondents differ in their individual
willingness-to-pay depending on personal characteristics. To address heterogeneity in
preferences for risk reduction, we use a non-linear conditional logit model with interaction
effects. The best estimate of the VSL in the context of fatal accidents on Alpine roads is in the
range of €4.9–5.4 million with distinct differences between the urban and the mountain
sample groups. We find the VSL to be significantly altered by socio-economic factors but
only marginally altered by the type of hazard.
Keywords: Value of Statistical Life; Choice experiment; Natural hazard mitigation; Traffic
safety
JEL Classification: D81; J17; R42
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1 Introduction
Alpine countries invest large amounts of money to mitigate natural hazards such as
avalanches, floods, and rockfalls. Switzerland, for example, spends approximately 0.6% of its
annual GDP on the mitigation of, and the recovery from, natural hazards (PLANAT 2005).
While a part of these efforts is financed through private sources, public expenditures cover the
lion’s share. Publicly funded mitigation programs have so far been focused on the costefficient supply of mitigation. An optimal resource allocation would, however, not only
consider the supply side but also the societal demand for safety improvements.
Stated preferences provide an operational basis to deduce the societal demand for safety
improvements. Surprisingly, few empirical studies have addressed these preferences in the
context of natural hazards. Brouwer and Bateman (2005) studied society’s valuation of flood
control measures in the Netherlands, Zhai and Ikeda (2006) analyzed the economic value of
evacuations during flood events in Japan, and Leiter and Pruckner (2009) estimated the
societal willingness-to-pay (WTP) for reductions in avalanche risk in Austria. All of these
studies used the contingent valuation approach to elicit WTP measures. This paper contributes
to the scarce literature by presenting a choice experiment to value improvements in traffic
safety on Alpine roads. It has been shown that this stated-preference approach is well-suited
to the study of societal preferences for mortality risk reductions and even allows individuating
these preferences (see Alberini et al. 2007; Bosworth et al. 2008; Tsuge et al. 2005).
Three research objectives guide our experimental investigation. First, we want to find
out how much society is willing to pay for reductions in mortality risk on public roads in the
Swiss Alps. Users of these roads are on one hand threatened by natural hazards such as snow
avalanches and rockfalls. On the other hand, road users face the common risk of car accidents,
whether it be through poor road conditions or through the dangerous behavior of other
drivers. Our experiment confronted survey respondents with discrete choices from among
hypothetical traffic safety programs to protect against these hazards and to reduce mortality
risks on Alpine roads. Based on their choices, we estimate the value of statistical life (VSL),
which has become the common metric to value lifesaving programs and environmental
regulations involving risks to human life (Hammitt 2000).
Second, psychometric research on risk suggests that characteristics such as
voluntariness, controllability, and origin of a hazard affect people’s risk perception (Slovic
1987; Slovic et al. 2000). Presumably, these factors affect the economic valuation of mortality
risk reductions (McDaniels et al. 1992; Subramanian and Cropper 2000), but empirical
evidence for these effects is relatively small (Chilton et al. 2002; Leiter and Pruckner 2009).
To broaden this evidence, we analyze how specific characteristics of the hypothetical traffic
safety programs and their perceived benefits affect the size of the VSL estimates.
2
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Third, there is an ongoing discussion as to whether the VSL should be individuated
according to age, wealth, health, and baseline risk (see Alberini et al. 2004; Baker et al. 2008;
Eeckhoudt and Hammitt 2001; Pratt and Zeckhauser 1996; Sunstein 2004). We study how
people differ in the WTP for risk reductions based on their socio-economic characteristics and
their exposure to natural hazards. In other words, we analyze preference heterogeneity in the
context of mortality risk, using a non-linear conditional logit model as introduced by Alberini
et al. (2007).
To address these research objectives, the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2
begins with a brief overview of mortality risks on Alpine roads and compares these risks to
other causes of death. We then describe the design of our survey, including the attributes and
levels selected to characterize the choice tasks, and summarize the characteristics of the
survey respondents. In Section 2.3, we theoretically deduce the VSL within the random utility
framework of discrete choice analysis and explain our modeling approach to analyze
preferences for mortality risk reductions. Selected results of the model estimations are
presented in Section 2.4. We first report the results for different specifications of the nonlinear conditional logit model. We then test the scope and sensitivity of these results. In
Section 2.5, we summarize our results and their implications for valuing mortality risk
reductions in the context of natural hazards.
2 Survey development, choice task, and sample characteristics
2.1 Overview of mortality risks on Alpine roads
Alpine roads are frequently exposed to natural hazards such as snow avalanches and rockfalls.
Within the last 15 years, three individuals per year have been killed on average in accidents
caused by rockfall or avalanche events on Swiss roads, while approximately 500 individuals
per year have died in car accidents (BFS 2007a). Although the population at risk is larger in
the case of car accidents (only about one quarter of the Swiss residents frequently drive on
Alpine roads), the probability of dying in a rockfall or avalanche accident on a road is
statistically small compared to other causes of death (Fig. 1). Yet, many people experience
feelings of dread when considering the risks from natural hazards since they are involuntarily
borne and are out of self-control. Dread has been found to be a perceptional factor that tends
to increase the WTP for mitigation (Chilton et al. 2002; Chilton et al. 2006; Subramanian and
Cropper 2000). In comparison, car accidents are a well-known risk and frequently analyzed in
VSL studies (de Blaeij et al. 2003). In our survey, we used car accidents as a reference risk to
see whether perceptional factors of natural hazards decrease or increase the societal WTP for
traffic safety on Alpine roads.

3
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

3

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 338 [2009]

Fig. 1 League table of statistical causes of death in Switzerland (compiled from BFS 2007a).

Since the individual risk of dying in rockfall or avalanche accidents is small and the
occurrence of such accidents is hardly predictable, it is a priori unknown whose life will be
saved by the implementation of a traffic safety program. Anybody traveling on Alpine roads
may potentially benefit from the risk reduction and, as far as public roads are concerned, no
one can be excluded from this benefit. Thus, traffic safety on Alpine roads is a public good.
The valuation of mortality risk reductions in the public goods context implies three major
challenges. First, the respondent’s WTP for risk reduction depends on the size of the affected
population or on the size that the respondent thinks of when evaluating the choice tasks
(Green et al. 1994; Kahneman et al. 1993). Second, the magnitude of the cost figures is used
as a mental anchor. Green et al. (1998) showed that the anchoring of prompted costs
systematically influences the responses in stated-preference studies. This can cause large
biases in the valuation of public goods, particularly if respondents have strategic incentives to
over- or understate their true WTP. Third, respondents may have preferences for reductions in
their own risk, in the risk to others, or in expressing mercy and solidarity with those people
exposed to a risk (Jones-Lee 1991; Viscusi et al. 1988).
We addressed the former two challenges by making the survey instrument as realistic as
possible. We presented the risk reduction as a hypothetical referendum for financing the
future maintenance of hazard mitigating infrastructure and clearly stated how many fatalities
each traffic safety program could avert at which cost. To reduce strategic answering, we used
a relative bid vehicle that personalized the cost of each of the alternative programs relative to

4
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a percentage of the respondent’s last tax payment. The advantage of this relative bid vehicle is
that, when converted to absolute values, it corresponds to the cost incurred to the respondent
if the program were to be eventually implemented (Schläpfer 2008).
The third challenge can hardly be resolved because the respondents’ preferences may be
simultaneously composed of egoistic, altruistic and warm glow motives (Jones-Lee 1991;
Kahneman and Knetsch 1992; Kahneman et al. 1999). In our study context, the individual risk
is small and the benefits of the proposed traffic safety programs are concentrated on the most
exposed people. We therefore conducted the choice experiment with respondents from two
different regions of Switzerland. One sample consisted of people from the mountainous
region around Davos, who are frequently exposed to natural hazards on Alpine roads. The
other sample consisted respondents from the city of Zurich, who are unlikely to be frequently
exposed. This split-sampling allows testing whether less exposed respondents may have
altruistic values, resulting in concerns about the safety of others (Rodriguez and Leon 2004).

2.2 Choice attributes and levels
In the design phase of the study, four focus groups, with participants from both sample
regions, were held to explore the relevant attributes of traffic safety on Alpine roads, the
understanding of the relative bid vehicle, and the use of various risk communication aids (see
Corso et al. 2001). The exploratory research also assisted in specifying the levels of each of
the relevant attributes so that respondents could understand improvements in traffic safety as a
result of changing attribute levels.
For this purpose, we discussed the current level of mitigation measures to protect
Alpine roads against natural hazards with a number of natural hazard experts consisting of
representatives of the responsible authorities, civil engineers, and scientists. These expert
interviews provided a semi-quantitative assessment of the current level of traffic safety on
Alpine roads, upon which we developed ‘what-if’ scenarios for the case that mitigation
measures would no longer be maintained.
The exploratory research resulted in the selection of four attributes to describe traffic
safety programs for Alpine roads: (1) the number of fatalities per year that are averted by a
specific traffic safety program; (2) the number of years over which the program would reduce
the risk; (3) the type of road hazard against which this program is effective; and (4) the cost of
this program to the taxpayer. Table 1 summarizes the selected attributes and levels used in the
choice experiment.
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Table 1 Attributes and attribute levels in the discrete choice tasks.
Attribute

Levels of the attribute

(1) Number of avoided fatalities per year

10, 12, 14, 16

(2) Duration of protection in years

10, 20, 30

(3) Type of road hazard

snow avalanches, rockfalls, car accidents

(4) Relative costs of the program as
percentage of the last tax payment

1%, 2%, 3%

Attribute (1) describes the benefit of the traffic safety programs in terms of averted
fatalities. Based on the expert interviews, we assumed that the number of fatalities caused by
natural hazards on Alpine roads would increase to 20 fatalities per year if current mitigation
measures were no longer maintained, but could be kept at the current level if these measures
were maintained into the future. Levels of the risk reduction were thus selected at 10, 12 14,
and 16 averted fatalities per year.
Attribute (2) captures the permanence of the risk reduction. We attempted to suggest
realistic periods of mitigation benefits based upon the life expectancy of different mitigation
measures to protect roads. In the focus groups, we observed that participants had difficulties
in calculating the total number of averted fatalities over the proposed period of mitigation
benefits. We therefore decided against presenting different mitigation periods between choice
alternatives, but changed the period of mitigation between choice sets.
Attribute (3) appoints the type of road hazard against which protection is provided.
Avalanches and rockfalls were selected as natural hazards endangering traffic on Alpine
roads, while car accidents were chosen as a reference risk to test for perceptional factors
associated with these natural hazards. We explained that car accidents can be caused by blind
curves, weak crash barriers, or speeding of other drivers to avoid emphasizing the selfcontrolled factors of driving.
Attribute (4) names the cost of each traffic safety program by describing it as a onetime
payment proportional to the respondents’ last annual tax payment. We provided respondents
with a conversion table through which they could easily derive their personalized cost-sharing
for each of the programs (Fig. 2). Married respondents who have a joint tax invoice, were
asked to divide their last tax payment by two in order to derive their personalized cost for
each program.

6
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Fig. 2 Conversion tool to calculate absolute bid amounts from percentages of taxes.

Two premises determined the size of the relative bids. First, the aggregated bids should
cover future expenditures for maintaining the protection of cantonal and communal roads
against avalanches and rockfalls over the next 30 years. Second, the prompted bid amounts
should allow for a large range of possible VSL values (Alberini et al. 2007). To comply with
these validity requirements, we estimated the public mitigation expenditures for Alpine roads
based on statistical data (BFS 2006; PLANAT 2005). Assuming that the annual mitigation
expenditures will remain at their current level, the present value of mitigation expenditures
over the next 30 years amounts to CHF 480–960 million, which is equal to 1.2–2.4% of the
annual tax payments in Switzerland (BFS 2007b).3 Consequently, the relative bid sizes were
selected as 1%, 2%, and 3% of the last tax payment.
Taking the average annual per capita tax payment of CHF 5,400 (BFS 2007b), the
relative bids would mean a onetime payment of CHF 54 (€35), CHF 108 (€70), and CHF 162
(€105).4 Using the basic VSL model outlined in Section 3 and assuming discount rates for
mortality risks between 0–15% (Viscusi and Aldy 2003), the absolute bids for the average
taxpayer imply VSL values in the range of CHF 0.3–6.3 million (€0.2–4.1 million); the
absolute bids for the highest tax class imply VSL values in the range of CHF 0.8–20.9 million
(€0.5–13.6 million); and the absolute bids for the lowest tax class imply VSL values in the
range of CHF 0.1–2.3 million (€0.1–2.7 million). This range is in-line with values found in
two meta-analyses of VSL estimates (Mrozek and Taylor 2002; Viscusi and Aldy 2003).

3

For deriving these present values, we used a discount rate of 1.5% based on the inflation-adjusted ten-year spot

interest rate on Swiss Confederation bonds.
4

At the time of the data collection, one Swiss franc corresponded to 0.65 Euro.
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2.3 Survey structure
To collect the data, we developed a mail survey consisting of five parts. The first part opened
with some attitudinal questions about the perception of natural hazards in general and their
perceived threat to roads in particular. In the second part, respondents had to balance
infrequent and severe avalanche accidents against frequent but less severe avalanche
accidents. The third part contained the actual choice task, which prompted respondents to
consider the hypothetical privatization of maintaining current mitigation measures against
rockfall, snow avalanche and car accidents on cantonal and communal roads in the Swiss
Alps.
We introduced the choice task by stating that today only three individuals die each year
in rockfall and avalanche accidents on roads, but that this number would quickly rise to 20
fatalities per year if mitigation measures would no longer be maintained. Respondents were
presented with the league table of annual mortality causes depicted in Fig. 1 to understand the
mortality risks involved with avalanche, rockfall and ordinary car accidents and to align these
risks with other causes of death.5
Respondents were then asked to imagine a national referendum for financing a traffic
safety program. They were told that every household would have to make such a onetime
payment on condition that the referendum was passed. The alternative traffic safety programs
were presented within six choice sets. For each choice set, respondents had to indicate which
of three options they prefer: program A, program B, or neither program. The last option was a
conditional status quo, whose choice implied the willingness to accept a rise in fatalities from
currently three to 20 per year.
Since we selected three attributes with three levels and one attribute with four levels for
describing the programs, 108 (= 33 × 4) different traffic safety programs were possible.
Consequently, a full factorial design would have resulted in 1,944 different choice sets.
(Remember that we did not vary the time attribute across alternatives in a specific choice set.)
We used a shifted orthogonal experimental design built from conventional fractional factorials
for linear models (Louviere et al. 2000) to reduce the number of choice sets. Based on this
experimental design, we generated 54 pairs of alternative programs segmented into nine
orthogonal blocks of six choice sets. According to Ferrini and Scarpa (2007), this
experimental design is particularly appropriate when there is a high degree of uncertainty
about the conditions that finally generate the choice-based dataset.
The outlined procedure resulted in nine survey versions, each of which contained six
different choice sets. To test whether different framings of the risk reduction attribute had an
5

This was the risk communication aid most preferred by the participants of the focus group research.
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impact on the valuation of the traffic safety programs, we sent out two survey formats with
different, but logically equivalent, framings. In this paper, we draw on the standard
assumption that choice experiments are context-independent (Carlsson and Martinsson 2008).
We therefore neglect the hypothesized framing effect in the discussion below, but will discuss
it in a separate paper.6
Subsequent to the choice task, the fourth part of the survey posed some debriefing
questions asking respondents to indicate how sure they were in their choices and whether they
had applied specific decision heuristics. The survey closed with questions about the socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents.

2.4 Respondents
The survey was mailed to 900 individuals who had previously agreed in a phone recruitment
to participate in the study. The sample was stratified by age and gender, with the number of
respondents roughly reflecting the age distribution of the Swiss residential population. Half of
the respondents were recruited in the mountainous region around Davos (the mountain
sample) and the other half in the city of Zurich (the urban sample). We required respondents
to be at least 18 years old, which is the minimum age for voting and for obtaining a driver’s
license in Switzerland.
Table 2 compares the socio-economic characteristics of our respondents to those of the
Swiss residential population, confirming that our study sample is representative. There is a
good representation of all age groups, even though respondents older than 69 years are
slightly underrepresented. With regard to the last tax bill, there is a under sampling of the
lowest income group. This correlates with the observation that sample has somewhat fewer
respondents who have had only primary education. Overall, there is a fair match-up of the
survey participants with the census data.
In the choice analysis, we discarded respondents who had answered less than three of
the six choice sets, assuming that they were either not willing or unable to respond. Three
respondents chose only program A and one respondent chose only program B, even when this
choice behavior was inconsistent with their earlier choices. These respondents were also
excluded from the choice analysis. The data cleaning left us with 2,572 valid choices from
433 respondents, corresponding to a response rate of 48%.

6

Preliminary results suggest that the framing effect is small and does not affect the VSL estimates.
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Table 2 Comparison of the sample characteristics to the Swiss residential population.
Variable

Study sample (N =433)

Swiss Population

Respondents
Mountain Sample
Urban Sample

49.0%
51.0%

–
–

Gender a
Women
Men

49.1%
50.9%

52.0%
48.0%

Age a
18–29
30–39
40–49
50–59
60–69
70 or older

14.6%
17.9%
27.3%
14.6%
15.4%
10.3%

17.0%
15.5%
19.4%
16.9%
14.2%
16.9%

Annual tax payments b
CHF 2,000 or less
CHF 2,000–6,000
CHF 6,000–10,000
CHF 10,000–14,000
CHF 14,000–18,000
More than CHF 18,000

15.0%
36.2%
27.2%
8.9%
4.2%
8.6%

27%
36%
16%
12%
2%
7%

Educational attainment a
Primary education
Secondary education
University education
Apprenticeship
Craftsman’s diploma

2.8%
12.3%
25.2%
43.8%
15.9%

13.3%
8.3%
23.1%
45.0%
10.3%

a
b

Based on (BFS 2007b).
Approximation of the annual tax payments of the Swiss population based on the distribution of the direct

federal tax payments (BFS 2009).

Since there are no official statistics of the number of people driving on Alpine roads, we
asked respondents how often they travel on these roads. Based on this self-declared risk
exposure and official census data for the mountainous and urban regions of Switzerland
(Hornung and Röthlisberger 2005), we defined the baseline population at risk as those 2
million individuals who drive more than once a week on Alpine roads. As described below,
we used this figure to quantify the annual statistical mortality risk reduction provided by each
of the traffic safety programs.
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3 Discrete choice model
3.1 Random utility framework for conditional logit models
Discrete choice models are founded in random utility theory (McFadden 2001). Applied to
mortality risks on Alpine roads, random utility theory assumes that the unobserved utility of a
specific traffic safety program k can be split into a deterministic component expressed by the
indirect utility function V and a random component ε that captures moods, affects and other
emotionally driven decision shortcuts used by individual i to evaluate the program k. Clearly,
the indirect utility V from choosing program k is determined by the program’s attributes and
the personal characteristics of individual i.
Formally, let Xik denote a vector of explanatory variables describing program k and
individual i, and β denote the corresponding vector of coefficients to be estimated. Then, the
random utility perceived by individual i from choosing program k can be written as:
U ik = V ( X ik ; β) + ε ik = Vik + ε ik

(1)

where εik is the random component of an unknown distribution εik ~ D(θε), with θε denoting
the parameters of this distribution.
The dichotomy of this random utility model (RUM) allows a decision framework to be
constructed by assuming that individual i prefers mitigation program k over the alternative
mitigation program j, if the utility entailed by this program k is larger than that of any other
program in the choice set J. Formally, the probability of choosing mitigation program k over
any other program j in the choice set is given by:
Pr( k | Xik ; β, θ ε ) = Pr[Vik + ε ik > Vij + ε ij , ∀j ≠ k ].

(2)

Based on distributional assumptions on the random component, several specifications of the
RUM model have been proposed (Walker and Ben-Akiva 2002). The widely used conditional
logit specification assumes that the random component is independently and identically (IID)
drawn from a Type-I extreme value distribution, i.e. εij ~ EV1(θε). The probability that
individual i chooses the specific program k is:
Pr( k | X i ; β, µ ) = exp[ µ V ( X ik ; β)]

∑ exp[µ V (X

ij

; β)] ,

(3)

∀j∈J
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where µ is a scale parameter usually normalized to one, implying constant error variance
(Louviere et al. 2000).
The estimation of the coefficient vector β involves maximizing the likelihood of the
stated choices. When N respondents are asked to engage in a series of Q choice tasks with J
choice alternatives, the maximization requires defining a binary choice indicator λijq. This
binary indicator takes the value λijq = 1 if individual i chooses the program j in choice task q,
and otherwise takes the value λijq = 0. Accordingly, the log-likelihood function LL to be
maximized over all stated choices becomes:
N

J

Q

LL(λi | X i ; β, θ ε ) = ∑∑∑ λijq ln[Pr( j | X i ; β, θ ε ] .

(4)

i =1 j =1 q =1

3.2 Estimating the VSL from discrete choice data
Estimating the VSL from discrete choices on alternative traffic safety programs requires
specifying the indirect utility function given in Eq. (1). In our study, the indirect utility of any
traffic safety program j depends on its risk reduction Rj and on its cost Cij, which varies for
each individual i due to the use of the relative bid vehicle. Characteristics of the traffic safety
program j, denoted by the vector Wj, and of the respondent i, denoted by the vector Zi, may
also go into the indirect utility function. Since these covariates do not vary over the repeated
choices of an individual, their vectors have to be interacted with either the risk or the cost
parameter. A generic form of the indirect utility function V ( Xij ; β) is then obtained as:
Vij = R j (α1 + Z i α 2 + W j α 3 ) + Cij ( β1 + Z i β 2 + W j β 3 ),

(5)

where α1 and β1 are the coefficients of the risk and cost parameter, and α2, α3, β2 and β3 are
coefficient vectors of the interaction effects between these parameters and selected covariates.
The particular design of our choice task requires some additional specifications. While
the cost Cij of each program j was implemented as a onetime payment to respondent i, the risk
reduction was implemented as a stream of annual risk reductions provided by program j over
the period of mitigation Tj. We used a constant exponential discounting model to discount the
stream of risk reduction, defining the discounted risk reduction Rj as:
Tj

1 − exp(−δ T j ) 
R j = ∫ π j exp(−δ t ) dt = π j 
,
δ


0

(6)
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where δ is the implicit discount rate and πj denotes the annual risk reduction by program j,
which is assumed to be constant over the period of mitigation.7 By inserting Eq. (6) into the
indirect utility function of Eq. (5), we may estimate the discount rate δ directly from the
choice data. Technically, this makes our model a non-linear conditional logit model.
In line with Alberini et al. (2007), we then posit that the marginal utility of risk
reduction for respondent i is given by the compound coefficient vector α = (α1 + Ziα2 + Wjα3)
and the marginal utility of wealth is given by the compound coefficient vector β = (β1 + Ziβ2 +
Wjβ3). Since the VSL is defined as the WTP for a marginal decrease in risk, it results from the
ratio of the estimated coefficient vectors: (αˆ / βˆ ) = (∂V/∂Rj)/(∂V/∂Cij).
4 Results
4.1 Qualitative results
The respondents had relatively homogenous attitudes toward natural hazards in general and to
their perceived threat to Alpine roads in particular. When asked about how they assess their
own risk of being killed through a snow avalanche or a rockfall, 69% of the respondents felt
barely endangered, 27% felt somewhat endangered, and only 2% felt strongly endangered;
another 2% found it hard to tell. When comparing the risk of snow avalanches or rockfalls to
roads with common road hazards, 84% of the respondents stated that they found the latter risk
more threatening, 11% found both risks equally threatening and only 3% found the risk of
natural hazards more threatening; again 2% found it hard to tell. With regard to the current
level of protection against snow avalanches and rockfalls, 67% of the respondents stated that
roads are sufficiently protected while 33% would like to see better protection. Against our
expectations, answers to these perceptional questions by the mountain and the urban samples
were not statistically different.
In Table 3, we examine the choice frequencies for traffic safety programs against the
different hazard types. Neither program was chosen in about 20% of the choice sets,
suggesting that respondents were not rejecting the programs without due consideration. The
choice frequency of programs against rockfall accidents was slightly higher than for programs
that protect against car accidents or avalanche accidents.

7

Since the number of people at risk on Alpine roads was determined at 2 million people, the annual risk

reduction πj provided by a traffic safety program j lies between 5 × 10–6 and 8 × 10–6 avoided fatalities.
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Table 3 Pattern of preferences for traffic safety programs against different road hazards.
Preferred traffic safety program

Percentage of choices

… against snow avalanches

24.8%

… against rockfalls

28.0%

… against car accidents

26.3%

… neither

20.9%

4.2 The basic VSL model
In the next sections, we report on selected results of the non-linear conditional logit model as
outlined in Section 2.3. We begin by presenting two estimates of the basic VSL model (Model
I), whose indirect utility function includes only the personalized cost and the discounted risk
reduction as explanatory variables (see Table 4). The two estimates of Model I differ only in
the number of choice observations. While the first estimate includes the full sample of
observations, the second is restricted to the observations of those respondents who also
answered the attitudinal questions necessary to estimate the interaction models presented
below (see Models III–IV).
The differences between the estimated coefficients are relatively small, indicating that
our basic model is relatively robust against restrictions in the sample size. All coefficients are
significant and have the expected signs. The coefficient of the risk parameter is positive,
indicating that the respondents valued risk reductions as benefits, while the coefficient of the
cost parameter is negative showing that spending private money on traffic safety programs
entails a disutility. The discount rate δ was estimated at 11.8% and 11.1% respectively, which
is at the upper range of discount rates reported in market-based VSL studies (Viscusi and
Aldy 2003). The coefficient estimates in Table 4 imply a VSL of CHF 8.26 million (€5.35
million) for the full sample and of CHF 7.64 million (€4.95 million) for the restricted sample.8
The corresponding WTP for the average traffic safety program is between CHF 49.70–53.70
(€32.30–34.90).9 Standard errors around the VSL estimates were calculated at CHF 1.41
million (€0.91 million) for the full sample and at CHF 1.32 million (€0.85 million) for the
restricted sample, using the Delta method (see Greene 2008: 69).

8

Technically, the VSL is estimated as [−αˆ1 / βˆ1 ] × 1 million. The multiplication by one million is necessary

since we coded the risk reduction as 5, 6, 7 and 8 instead of 5 × 10−6, 6 × 10−6, 7 × 10−6 and 8 × 10−6.
9

The individual mean WTP for the average traffic safety program is calculated by multiplying the VSL value by

the mean risk reduction provided by the programs, which is equal to 6.5 × 10−6.
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Table 4 Model I: Basic conditional logit model (full and the restricted sample).

Parameters

Full Sample
Coefficient a

t-stat

Coefficient a

t-stat

0.02809
(0.00481)

5.814

0.02656
(0.00466)

5.700

– 0.00340
(0.00031)

– 10.983

– 0.00348
(0.00032)

– 10.824

0.11808
(0.02580)

4.577

0.11102
(0.02529)

4.390

Marginal utility of risk reduction (α1)
Marginal utility of cost (β1)
Discount rate (δ)
Number of observations (Q)

2,572

2,388

433

402

– 2,578.46

– 2,398.46

0.0875

0.0858

Number of respondents (N)
Log-likelihood function (LL1)

Restricted Sample

Likelihood ratio index b
a

Standard errors in parentheses;

b

Calculated as 1 – LL1/LL0, where LL0 denotes the log-likelihood function of the constant-only model.

4.3 The effect of wealth on the VSL
The use of the relative bid vehicle allows exploration of how the VSL varies with wealth.
Economic theory suggests that the VSL marginally increases with increasing wealth.10
Hammitt and Treich (2007) provide two reasons for this wealth effect. First, wealthier people
lose more in absolute terms when they die. Second, their utility cost of spending is smaller
due to the standard assumption of decreasing marginal utility with respect to wealth. To test
for this wealth effect, Model II includes an interaction between the personalized cost of the
program Cij and the logarithm of the last tax bill τi, i.e. Vij = α1 × Rj + β1 × Cij + βτ × Cij × ln(τi),

10

To prove this assertion, we draw on the definition of the VSL as the marginal rate of substitution between

wealth and mortality risk. The standard model of WTP for changes in mortality risk defines the VSL as
(Hammitt 2000): VSL ≡

dw
dp

=

u ( w) −v ( w)
(1− p )u '( w)+ pv '( w)

, where p is the individual’s probability of dying during a defined

period and u(w) and v(w) denote the utilities derived from wealth conditional on surviving or dying in that
period. (The primes indicate first derivatives with respect to wealth.) Some assumptions are commonly made on
the form of the utility functions: (i) survival is preferred to death: u(w) > v(w); (ii) the marginal utility of wealth
is non-negative and greater in life than in death: u'(w) > v'(w) ≥ 0; and (iii) individuals are risk averse with
respect to wealth: u"(w) ≤ 0, v"(w) ≤ 0. Under these assumptions, the first derivative of the VSL with respect to
wealth is always positive (∂VSL/∂w > 0) and the second derivative is always non-negative (∂2VSL/∂w2 ≥ 0).
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whereby ln(τi) serves as a measure of the utility of wealth.11 The interaction term captures the
difference between how much wealthier people and poorer people are willing to pay, relative
to their wealth status. Table 5 presents the estimations of this model using both the full and
the restricted sample of observations.
Table 5 Model II: Conditional logit model with tax interaction (full and restricted sample).

Parameters

Full Sample

Marginal utility of risk reduction (α1)
Marginal utility of cost (β1)

Restricted Sample
t-stat

Coefficient a

t-stat

0.03871
(0.00619)

6.255

0.03706
(0.00600)

6.180

– 0.01677
(0.00158)

– 10.614

– 0.01718
(0.00164)

– 10.452

0.00502
(0.00050)

10.122

0.00515
(0.00052)

9.972

0.13948
(0.02652)

5.258

0.13281
(0.02590)

5.128

Coefficient

a

Interaction with the cost parameter:
log of last tax payment (βτ)
Discount rate (δ)
Number of observations (Q)
Number of respondents (N)
Log-likelihood function (LL1)
Likelihood ratio index

b

2,572

2,388

433

402

– 2,538.99

– 2,360.06

0.1014

0.1004

a

Standard errors in parentheses;

b

Calculated as 1 – LL1/LL0, where LL0 denotes the log-likelihood function of the constant-only model.

In line with theoretical expectations, we find that the VSL marginally increases with
wealth, i.e. ∂2VSL/∂τi2 > 0. In other words, wealthier respondents are willing to pay
proportionally more on the traffic safety programs than poorer respondents. Fig. 3 depicts the
effect of the last tax bill on the size of the VSL estimates indicating that, at low wealth levels,
the VSL is relatively inelastic toward changes in wealth (the elasticity of the VSL toward
changes from CHF 2,000 to CHF 4,000 in tax payments is 0.53), but becomes increasingly
elastic at higher wealth levels (the elasticity of the VSL toward changes from CHF 16,000
beyond CHF 18,000 in tax payments is 1.87). The arc elasticity of the VSL over the range of
tax amounts is determined at 1.01, but shrinks to 0.84 when weighted by the class-frequency
11

We tested other functional forms of the utility of wealth, but these functions did either provide much lower

log-likelihood functions or did not converge. Consequently, we used the log form and estimated the tax-specific
VSL(τi) ≡ (∂Vij /∂Rj /∂Vij/∂Cij) = [α1 /(β1 + βτ × ln(τi))]. For computational ease, we coded the tax payment τi as 2,
4, 8, 12, 16 and 18.
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of the taxpayers in the sample. It should, however, be warned that the estimation of VSL
values of the second highest tax class was based on a limited number of respondents (N = 18).

Fig. 3 Tax class-specific VSL values estimated based on Model II.

The above reported elasticity cannot be directly converted to income elasticities because
the Swiss tax law permits tax deductions, which depend on the home canton and individual
characteristics that are not necessarily related to income and wealth. However, since
Switzerland has a progressive tax regime, the corresponding income elasticities of the
majority of respondents are larger than unity. This is inline with assertions by McFadden and
Leonard (1993) and Schläpfer (2008) that income elasticities of WTP less than unity
constitute grounds for doubting the validity of stated-preference studies.

4.4 The effect of personal characteristics on the VSL
Personal characteristics other than wealth also affect the WTP for traffic safety on Alpine
roads. Table 6 presents two interaction models estimated with the restricted sample, which
individuate the marginal utilities of risk reduction and wealth, as urged by Sunstein (2004). In
this way, it becomes possible to identify sources of heterogeneity in preferences for mortality
risk reductions. Model III interacts the risk parameter with the personal socio-economic
characteristics and the cost parameter with the last tax payment of the respondent, so that the
VSL becomes conditional on the respondent’s background.
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Table 6 Models III–IV: Conditional logit model with personalized marginal utility of risk reduction and cost.

Parameters

Model III

Model IV
t-stat

Coefficient a

t-stat

0.03783
(0.00668)

5.659

0.04475
(0.00764)

5.859

– 0.00036
(0.00007)

– 4.791

– 0.00039
(0.00008)

– 4.900

Gender (female = 1)

0.00522
(0.00229)

1.884

0.00469
(0.00251)

1.871

University degree (yes = 1)

0.02649
(0.00723)

3.454

0.02732
(0.00787)

3.517

Sample affiliation (urban sample = 1)

0.01394
(0.00358)

3.414

0.01272
(0.00365)

3.484

Sample affiliation × university degree
(urban academics = 1)

– 0.02035
(0.00687)

– 2.686

– 0.02021
(0.00748)

– 2.703

Experience with natural hazards
(previous experience = 1)

– 0.00651
(0.00237)

– 2.752

Avalanche accident (yes = 1)

– 0.00277
(0.00123)

– 2.250

Rockfall accident (yes = 1)

– 0.00245
(0.00225)

– 1.091

Coefficient
Marginal utility of risk reduction (α1)

a

Interactions with the risk parameter:
Age

Marginal utility of cost (β1)

– 0.01706
(0.00167)

10.229

– 0.01841
(0.00171)

– 10.799

0.00515
(0.00053)

9.693

0.00535
(0.00053)

10.172

0.00256
(0.00062)

4.153

0.11071
(0.02149)

5.152

Interactions with the cost parameter:
Log of last tax payment
Perceived safety on roads
(current protection is insufficient = 1)
Discount rate (δ)
Number of observations (Q)
Number of respondents (N)
Log-likelihood function (LL1)
Likelihood ratio index b

0.11023
(0.02150)

5.127

2,388

2,388

402

402

– 2,304.51

– 2,286.26

0.1216

0.1285

a

Standard errors in parentheses;

b

Calculated as 1 – LL1/LL0, where LL0 denotes the log-likelihood function of the constant-only model.
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The significant coefficient of the interaction term between a sample indicator dummy
(mountain sample = 0; urban sample = 1) and the risk parameter indicates that, ceteris
paribus, respondents from the urban sample had a 30% higher marginal utility of risk
reduction (see Table 6). While surprising at first glance, we offer two possible explanations
for this result. First, people who are more familiar with natural hazards might have a higher
risk acceptance, as they see these risks as part of living in the mountains. Corresponding
statements made by focus group participants from the mountainous region support this
explanation. Second, respondents from the urban sample have altruistic motives that increase
their marginal utility of risk reduction (Rodriguez and Leon 2004), although their personal
benefit from traffic safety on Alpine roads is smaller than that of respondents from the
mountain sample. This explanation is supported by answers made by respondents from the
urban sample to the debriefing questions at the end of the survey.
To further explore the first explanation, we included two interaction terms: a two-way
interaction between the risk parameter and a dummy indicating whether the respondent holds
a university degree, and a three-way interaction between this university dummy, the risk
parameter and the sample indicator dummy. This revealed that respondents with an academic
background generally had a higher marginal utility of risk reduction, and that this preference
was particularly strong for academics from the mountain sample. Accordingly, non-academics
from the mountain sample placed a much lower value on risk reduction than the rest of the
respondents. The debriefing questions revealed that non-academics from the mountain sample
feel entitled to the benefits of mitigation and are not willing to privately contribute to its
financing.
The interaction term between the age of the respondent and the risk parameter indicates
a decrease in the marginal utility of risk reductions by approximately 0.9% per life year. This
is in line with empirical observations that the VSL decreases with age (Viscusi and Aldy
2003). Alberini et al. (2004) propose two explanations for this age effect that could affect the
valuation of reduced mortality riskthe individual risk exposure and the utility of wealth. As
risk exposure on Alpine roads presumably declines with increasing age (older people tend to
travel less), we tested a three-way interaction between risk, self-reported exposure and age.
This interaction term had a negligibly small effect on the age coefficient, suggesting that the
age effect is not caused by correlations between exposure and age but by decreasing utility of
wealth.
The interaction term between the gender of the respondent and the risk parameter was
barely significant at the 5% level and further testing by means of a bootstrap re-estimation
with 200 random resamplings resulted in a non-significant coefficient. This corresponds with
observations by Davidson and Freudenburg (1996) who found that women and men have
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similar perceptions of most environmental risks. Since, in both samples, men were more
likely to hold a university degree than women, we tested for a three-way interaction effect
between the gender, the risk parameter and the university dummy, which also turned out to be
insignificant. Thus, gender had no significant impact on the valuation tasks in this study.
The interaction term between the tax payment and the cost parameter resulted in
qualitatively similar results to those in Model II. We additionally tested a three-way
interaction between the cost parameter, the last tax payment and the sample indicator dummy,
which rejected the hypothesis that the two samples differed with regard to wealth in a manner
that influenced the valuation of the costs.

4.5 The effects of perceptional factors on the VSL
Model IV extends Model III by including further interaction terms between the risk parameter
and the road hazard type, between the risk parameter and perceptional factors of risk, and
between the cost parameter and the respondent’s appraisal of the current level of safety on
Alpine roads. To this end, car accidents were coded as the reference risk, i.e. negative
(positive) coefficients of the avalanche and rockfall dummies in 6 imply a decrease (increase)
in the perceived risk compared to car accidents.
The coefficient of the interaction term between the risk parameter and the rockfall
dummy was not significant, indicating that the perceived risk from car accidents and rockfall
accidents does not differ in a way that affects the demand for risk reduction. In comparison,
the interaction term between the risk parameter and the avalanche dummy was significant and
had a negative sign, suggesting that avalanche accidents were perceived as less worthy to be
mitigated. One possible explanation for this different perception of the three road hazard types
is that avalanche accidents are relatively rare whereas car accidents and rockfall accidents
frequently occur, although they do not always cause fatalities. We tested an additional
interaction effect between the risk parameter, the hazard type and the sample indicator
dummy. This three-way interaction was not significant, indicating that the perception of the
road hazard type was not systematically different between the sample groups.
The interaction term between self-reported experience and the risk parameter showed
that respondents, who stated that they or their relatives had prior experiences with natural
hazards, valued the marginal utility of risk reductions less than respondents who had no prior
experiences. The same effect was found for the self-declared exposure but we omitted this
variable in the presented models due to its strong correlation with the sample affiliation of the
respondent, which would have induced problems of heteroscedasticity (Greene 2008). In line
with observations from psychometric risk research (see Slovic et al. 2000), we conclude that
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respondents, who had more knowledge about natural hazards, perceived the risks on Alpine
roads as less threatening than those who had no prior experiences.
As expected, the interaction term between the cost parameter and the attitude toward the
current protection on Alpine roads was significant. Respondents who stated that the current
level of safety against natural hazards on Alpine roads was insufficient were willing to spend
14% more on the traffic safety programs than those who felt that current safety was sufficient.
The coefficients of the other interaction effects in Model IV were of comparable size to
those estimated in Model III (see 6). A likelihood ratio test (LRT) showed that the inclusion
of the additional interaction terms between the risk parameter and the hazard type and
between the cost parameter and the attitude toward current safety did significantly improve
the model (LRT: χ2〈13–9〉 = 36.50; P < 0.001). By applying the estimated coefficients to the
actual choice observations of the respondents, one can generate distributions of the VSL
values implied with these choices (Fig. 4). These distributions illustrate that, depending on the
individual characteristics, the marginal rate of substitution between risk reduction and money
varies within a broad range. The 95% percentile was CHF 16.4 million (€10.7 million) for the
distribution based on Model III and CHF 19.2 million (€12.5 million) for the distribution
based on Model IV. The mean values of these VSL distributions (Model III: CHF 5.7 million;
Model IV: CHF 8.2 million) were substantially above the median values (Model III: CHF 4.2
million; Model IV: CHF 4.3 million), suggesting that wealthy taxpayers contribute overproportionally to the VSL point estimate of Model I.

Fig. 4 Distributions of the personalized VSL estimated based on Model III (Panel A) and Model IV (Panel B).

The distribution mean VSL values are CHF 5.74 million (Model III) and CHF 8.24 million (Model IV), the 95%
percentiles are CHF 16.37 million (Model III) and CHF 19.22 (Model IV).
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4.6 Scope and sensitivity tests
The validity of stated-preference studies is often challenged by opponents who argue that,
being of hypothetical nature, the stated choices fail to be related to real transactions as
observed in markets. It has therefore become standard to test the scope and sensitivity of the
results obtained from stated-preference studies (Heberlein et al. 2005; Leiter and Pruckner
2009). The basic requirement in every scope test of VSL estimates is that respondents receive
a positive marginal utility from risk reductions and a negative marginal utility of costs, i.e.
they are willing to pay for risk reductions, but not at any price. The results of Models I–IV
conform to these requirements.
To control for the reliability of our original estimates, we cross-validated these results
using re-estimations with the bootstrap method (Efron and Tibshirani 1993). These reestimations relied on 200 replications of random resamplings with replacement from the
sample of observations, where each of these replications consisted of Q = 2,388 draws. The
bootstrap estimations yielded robust standard errors around the bootstrap coefficients, which
allowed computing 95% confidence intervals by multiplying the bootstrap standard errors of
the coefficient estimates by 1.96.
We then re-estimated the models by dropping all observations (i) from those
respondents who stated in the debriefing questions that they felt particularly uncertain about
their choices and (ii) from the first and last choice set of every respondent. Neither of these reestimations altered the broad picture of the model results. The coefficient estimates of these
restricted models were all within their corresponding 95% confidence intervals, though some
of the interaction effects deviated substantially from the original model estimates. Table 7
exemplifies this validity check for the re-estimations of Model IV, indicating that our original
coefficient estimates are robust against confounding influences of hidden variables.
The validity of stated-preference studies is not only determined by scope sensitivity, but
also by the robustness of the valuation measures toward changes in specific attribute levels.
We therefore analyzed the effects of marginal changes in the risk and cost parameters of the
traffic safety programs. First, consider a marginal increase in the cost Cik of the traffic safety
program k. We were interested in how much this increase would decrease the probability
Pr(k|i) that individual i had chosen this program.
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Table 7 Comparison of the coefficient estimates of the re-estimated Model IV with the 95% confidence intervals

obtained from bootstrap standard errors.
Parameters

95% confidence interval

Restricted model coefficients

lower limit

upper limit

Coefficient a

Coefficient b

0.02806

0.06374

0.04461

0.04688

age

– 0.00057

– 0.00022

– 0.00032

– 0.00038

gender (female = 1)

– 0.00065

0.01048

0.00758

0.00555

university degree (yes = 1)

0.01139

0.04663

0.02199

0.02934

sample affiliation (urban sample = 1)

0.00522

0.02131

0.00885

0.01163

sample affiliation × university degree

– 0.03794

– 0.00412

– 0.01140

– 0.02124

experience with natural hazards
(previous experience = 1)

– 0.01215

– 0.00115

– 0.00857

– 0.00672

avalanche accident (yes = 1)

– 0.00522

– 0.00047

– 0.00287

– 0.00209

rockfall accident (yes = 1)

– 0.00776

0.00261

– 0.00292

0.00028

Marginal utility of cost (β1)

– 0.02203

– 0.01497

– 0.01687

– 0.01997

log of last tax payment

0.00430

0.00647

0.00478

0.00590

perceived safety on roads
(current protection is insufficient = 1)

0.00139

0.00370

0.00258

0.00253

0.06237

0.16703

0.10786

0.11643

Marginal utility of risk reduction (α1)
Interactions with the risk parameter:

(urban academics = 1)

Interactions with the cost parameter:

Discount rate (δ)
a

Sample restriction by dropping observations of uncertain respondents.

b

Sample restriction by dropping observations of the first and of the last choice set for each respondent.

By taking the partial derivative of the choice probability as defined in Eq. (3) with
respect to the cost parameter, the marginal effect becomes (the detailed derivation is given in
the Appendix):

M(Cik ) =

∂ Pr(k | i)
= ( β1 + Wk β 2 + Ziβ 3 ) Pr(k | i )(1 − Pr(k | i)) = β Pr(k | i)(1 − Pr(k | i )),
∂Cik

(7)

where β = (β1 + Ziβ2 + Wjβ3) denotes the compound coefficient vector of the cost interactions.
Similarly, the marginal effect of a change in the discounted risk reduction Rk on the choice
probability of program k is given by (the detailed derivation is given in the Appendix):
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M ( Rk ) =

∂ Pr( k | i )
= (α1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) Pr( k | i )(1 − Pr( k | i )) = α Pr( k | i )(1 − Pr( k | i )),
∂Rk

(8)

where α = (α1 + Ziα2 + Wjα3) denotes the compound coefficient vector of the risk reduction
interactions.
Since the marginal effects differ across individuals and choice sets, we calculated the
weighted marginal mean effects over all choice observations Q, using the weighting
procedure outlined by Louviere et al. (2000) to adjust for outlying estimates of choice
probabilities that could otherwise lead to overestimations of marginal effects.12 Table 8 gives
the weighted mean marginal effects of changes in the risk and cost parameter for Models III–
IV. These mean marginal effects show that a unit change, either in the discounted risk
reduction or in the cost of a program, has an insignificantly small impact on the choice
probability of a traffic safety program.
Table 8 Marginal effects and point elasticities of changes on the choice probability of traffic safety programs.

Variable

Model III

Model IV

Marginal mean effect of change in cost

– 0.00149

– 0.00151

Point elasticity of cost

– 0.35096

– 0.35101

Marginal mean effect of change in risk reduction

0.00727

0.00747

Point elasticity of risk reduction

0.73851

0.74664

Based on the marginal effects, it is straightforward to derive the (weighted) point
elasticities of changes in risk reduction and in costs as E(Rk) = M(Rk) × Rk × Pr(k|i)–1 and
E(Cik) = M(Cik) × Cik × Pr(k|i)–1, respectively (Greene 2008). These point elasticities measure
the percentage change in the choice probability of a particular program with respect to a 1%
change in either the risk reduction or the cost parameter of this particular program. For the
most extensive Models III–IV, the choice probability was found to be relatively inelastic (–1
< E(Cik) < 0, 0 < E(Rk) < 1; see Table 8), suggesting that the VSL estimations based on our
non-linear conditional choice model are robust against small changes in the key attributes of
the traffic safety programs.

12

Louviere et al. (2000) define the weighted marginal effect of changes in the attribute X for all observations Q

as: M ( X ) =

∑

Q
q =1

[M q ( X ) Pr(q ) ∑Qq=1 Pr(q )] , where q denotes one choice observation, Mq(X) is the marginal

effect of a change in X in this particular observation, and Pr(q) denotes the choice probability of every single
choice observation q.
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5 Discussion and conclusions
This article has analyzed public preferences for mortality risk reductions on Alpine roads.
Using a choice experiment, we asked respondents how much they would be willing to
contribute in order to maintain the current level of traffic safety on these roads. The prompted
tradeoffs between risk reduction and money imply a VSL in the range of CHF 7.6 to 8.3
million (€4.9 to 5.4 million), which is in the ballpark of VSL estimates obtained from other
stated preference studies in the context of public risk to life and limb (Alberini et al. 2007;
Hultkrantz et al. 2006). Our VSL estimates are somewhat above the figure of CHF 5 million
(€3.25 million) currently used by the Swiss administration to evaluate mitigation programs
against natural hazards (PLANAT 2005). On the other hand, they are distinctly lower than
estimates of a Swiss labor market study (Baranzini and Ferro Luzzi 2001), which obtained
inflation adjusted VSL values in the range of CHF 10.8 to 16.2 million (€7.0 to 10.5 million).
Mortality risks on Alpine roads are predominantly borne by frequent road users and are
thus unevenly spread over the population. We therefore recruited respondents from a
mountainous region and from an urban region of Switzerland, representing exposed and
unexposed people. To our surprise, respondents from the mountain group were ceteris paribus
willing to pay less for the proposed traffic safety programs, though they are more exposed and
would hence benefit more from the reductions in risk. We find two explanations for this
apparent violation of rational choice behavior.
First, an interaction effect between the origin and the education of the respondents
revealed that non-academics from the mountain sample had a significant lower marginal
utility of risk reduction. As indicated by comments on returned survey questionnaires, this
group of respondents felt that it was the duty of the government to take care of their safety on
Alpine roads. They refused to make private contributions to the proposed safety traffic
programs more often than the rest of the respondents. (The choice frequency of the neither
option was at 25% for non-academics from the mountain sample, while it was at 16% for the
remaining respondents.) We conclude that a withdrawal of public resources for the protection
of Alpine roads, as hypothesized in the description of our choice task, caused protest behavior
among respondents who feel entitled to safety on Alpine roads.
Second, past research has found that preferences for public goods are determined by
complicated patterns of egoistic and altruistic motives (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992;
Kahneman et al. 1999). Altruism is a non-use value that becomes relevant for the economic
valuation of mortality risk reductions if individuals are concerned about the safety of others
but indifferent with respect to further determinants of welfare (Jones-Lee 1991). While our
results suggest the existence of altruist values for road safety in the Alps, we could not
determine whether these values are driven by such paternalistic motives. What we found is,
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however, that respondents who are rarely or never exposed to hazards on Alpine roads were
obviously concerned about the reduction of risks threatening the lives of others. Frequently
exposed people showed a higher risk tolerance. In line with Chilton et al. (2006), we argue
that the marginal utility of risk reduction of these respondents is smaller, because they are
more familiar with natural hazards and feel therefore less threatened.
Clearly, the perception of mortality risks involved with driving on Alpine roads played
an important role in the valuation of the traffic safety programs. This is not astonishing, since
the standard economic model of choice implies that preferences over levels of consumption of
goods are made up of the individual’s subjective perceptions of these goods. The expressed
preferences are functions of attitudes, experiences, and beliefs, including both observed and
unobserved components (McFadden 2001). We find it, therefore, surprising that the hazard
type played a minor role in the overall valuation of the alternatives traffic safety programs
although the attitudinal questions in the survey indicated that the respondents perceived the
risk of car accidents as most threatening. In fact, the hazard type had an insignificant effect on
the stated WTP, which was only about 6% lower for programs directed against avalanches
than for programs against car accidents. There was no statistical difference between programs
directed against rockfall or car accidents. We conclude that most respondents did not paid
attention to the hazard type, but emphasized on the costs and expected risk reductions.
The experimental design of our study allowed the investigation of several aspects of
heterogeneity in preferences for mortality risk reductions. The results provide evidence for
discerning the VSL based upon the personal background of the people at risk (Sunstein 2004).
Besides personal characteristics such as the age or education of a respondent, the individuated
VSL is mainly driven by the marginal utility of wealth. We found that the WTP for risk
reductions increases over-proportionally with wealth. Though this observation corresponds
with the assumption of marginally decreasing utility of wealth, the wealth effect is rather
strong. We attribute the size of the wealth effect to the use of the relative bid vehicle, which
implied high bid amounts to wealthy respondents. However, this bid structure reflects the
progressive Swiss tax regime due to which public programs are foremost financed through
taxes provided by wealthier citizens.
In conclusion, we provide new insights to the valuation of road hazards on Alpine
roads. By testing several interaction effects of personal characteristics and individual risk
perceptions, we were able to identify sources of heterogeneity in preferences for mortality risk
reductions. We found evidence that the utility of wealth plays a key role in the valuation of
the proposed traffic safety programs. These results suggest that individuating the cost
parameterand possibly also the risk parameteris a promising way to analyze differences
in the individual WTP for mortality risk reductions.
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Appendix
A1 Marginal effect of a change in the cost of a mitigation program
The marginal effect of a change in the cost parameter Ci,k on individual i’s probability Pr(k|i)
to choose the mitigation program k is derived as:

M(Ci ,k ) =

 exp[ Rk (α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + Ci ,k ( β1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 )]  1
∂ Pr( k | i )

= ∂
 ∑ exp[ R j (α 1 + W j α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + Ci , j ( β1 + W j β 2 + Z i β 3 )]  ∂C i , k
∂Ci ,k
 j∈J



=



(

( β1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 ) exp[ Rk (α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + C i ,k ( β1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 )] − (exp[ Rk (α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + C i ,k ( β 1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 )]) 2

(∑

j∈J

exp[ R j (α 1 + W j α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + C i , j ( β 1 + W j β 2 + Z i β 3 )]

)

)=

2

( β 1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 ) exp[ Rk (α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + Ci ,k ( β1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 )] ( 1 − exp[ Rk (α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + Ci ,k ( β 1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 )] )

(∑

j∈J

exp[ R j (α 1 + W j α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + C i , j ( β 1 + W j β 2 + Z i β 3 )]

)

2

( β 1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 ) exp[ Rk (α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + Ci ,k ( β1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 )] (1 − exp[ Rk (α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + Ci ,k ( β 1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 )] )

(∑

j∈J

exp[ R j (α 1 + W j α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + C i , j ( β 1 + W j β 2 + Z i β 3 )]

)( ∑

j∈J

exp[ R j (α 1 + W j α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + Ci , j ( β 1 + W j β 2 + Z i β 3 )]

( β 1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 ) Pr(k | i )(1 − exp[ Rk (α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + C i ,k ( β1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 )])

∑

j∈J

exp[ R j (α 1 + W j α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + C i , j ( β 1 + W j β 2 + Z i β 3 )]

=

=

)

=

( β 1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 ) Pr(k | i )(1 − Pr(k | i )) = β Pr(k | i )(1 − Pr( k | i )),

(A1)

where β = β1 + Ziβ2 + Wjβ3 denotes the compound coefficient vector of the cost interactions.
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A2 Marginal effect of a change in the risk reduction provided by a mitigation program
The marginal effect of a change in the risk parameter Rk on on individual i’s probability
Pr(k|i) to choose the mitigation program k is derived as:

M( Rk ) =

 exp[ Rk (α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + Ci ,k ( β1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 )]  1
∂ Pr(k | i )

= ∂
 ∑ exp[ R j (α 1 + W j α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + C i , j ( β 1 + W j β 2 + Z i β 3 )]  ∂Rk
∂Rk
 j∈J



 =


(

(α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) exp[ Rk (α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + Ci ,k ( β1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 )] − (exp[ Rk (α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + Ci ,k ( β 1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 )]) 2

(∑

j∈J

exp[ R j (α 1 + W j α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + C i , j ( β 1 + W j β 2 + Z i β 3 )]

)

)=

2

(α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) exp[ Rk (α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + Ci ,k ( β 1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 )] (1 − exp[ Rk (α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + C i ,k ( β1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 )] )

(∑

j∈J

exp[ R j (α 1 + W j α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + C i , j ( β 1 + W j β 2 + Z i β 3 )]

)

2

(α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) exp[ Rk (α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + Ci ,k ( β 1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 )] (1 − exp[ Rk (α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + Ci ,k ( β 1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 )] )

(∑

j∈J

exp[ R j (α 1 + W j α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + Ci , j ( β 1 + W j β 2 + Z i β 3 )]

)( ∑

j∈J

exp[ R j (α 1 + W j α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + Ci , j ( β 1 + W j β 2 + Z i β 3 )]

(α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) Pr(k | i )(1 − exp[ Rk (α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + Ci ,k ( β 1 + Wk β 2 + Z i β 3 )])

∑

j∈J

exp[ R j (α 1 + W j α 2 + Z i α 3 ) + C i , j ( β 1 + W j β 2 + Z i β 3 )]

=

=

)

=

(α 1 + Wk α 2 + Z i α 3 ) Pr(k | i )(1 − Pr( k | i )) = α Pr(k | i )(1 − Pr( k | i )),

(A2)

where α = α1 + Ziα2 + Wjα3 denotes the compound coefficient vector of the risk reduction
interactions.
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